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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the impact of the tightening in price cap by OFWAT and of other operational 
factors on the efficiency of water and sewerage companies in England and Wales using a mixture of 
data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis. Previous empirical results suggest that 
the regulatory system introduced at privatization was lax. The 1999 price review signaled a 
tightening in regulation which is shown to have led to a significant reduction in technical 
inefficiency. The new economic environment set by price-cap regulation acted to bring inputs closer 
to their cost-minimizing levels from both a technical and allocative perspective.  
1 Introduction 
The England and Wales water and sewerage industry was privatized in 1989 and 
thenceforth has been subject to a sequence of five-year price controls in the form of price 
caps. Price-cap regulation is set out to be a high-powered incentive scheme. However, 
previous empirical findings have shown that the cap introduced at privatization in 1989 
had been lax (Saal and Parker, 2000), in the sense of allowing real price increases and the 
evidence that the first price review in 1994 produced efficiency gains is weak (Saal and 
Parker, 2001 and 2004). This may be explained by the double duty of the regulator to 
encourage a higher level of efficiency and provide the companies with the financial 
resources to support their investment programs. 
The 1999 price review signaled a change in the implementation of regulatory policy by 
imposing for the first time a real price reduction. 
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appreciated the useful comments from Ian Byatt, Giovanni Fraquelli, Mark Stewart and seminar participants 
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As noted by Weyman-Jones et al (2006), incentive regulation has many attractive 
properties but a number of practical concerns may arise when a regulation model has to be 
implemented in practice. Therefore, it appears that the attainability of many of the 
desirable properties of incentive regulation is an empirical issue (Uri, 2003). 
Our paper aims at exploring whether incentive regulation (namely, the tightening of 
regulation in 1999) actually resulted in an increase in performance. In particular, issues we 
wish to deal with – and that may be of interest to regulators in a broader perspective – are: 
how is it possible to account for different environmental conditions when implementing a 
yardstick competition model? Is incentive regulation able to drive to improved efficiency 
under both a technical and allocative perspective? Does incentive regulation (and other 
environmental variables) differently impact on the efficient use of individual inputs? 
In facing these questions, we used a DEA-based two stage approach derived from Fried 
et al (2002). In the first stage, DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) is run over a balanced 
panel data of the ten water and sewerage companies for the period from 1992-93 to 2004-
05. In this stage, estimates of technical and allocative efficiency are obtained. In the 
second stage, we calculate input-specific excess utilization and allocative distortion 
measures, and regress them on a set of environmental variables using Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA). These explanatory variables are chosen to represent both the operational 
and regulatory environment under which the firms operate. In this way, we provide a 
decomposition of the DEA-based overall technical and allocative inefficiency into three 
components: environmental impact, pure managerial inefficiency and statistical noise. 
This approach has several advantages, which may be regarded as attractive properties 
by regulators. First, it makes it possible to incorporate environmental effects and statistical 
noise into a DEA-based model. Second, it allows us to evaluate the impact of operational 
and regulatory environment on both technical and allocative efficiency of regulated firms. 
Third, it provides input-specific efficiency measures, which can be decomposed in order to 
identify the pure managerial efficiency separately from environmental effects and noise. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general 
description of the regulatory regime for the English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry, which offers a context to the research question this paper deals with. Section 3 is 
a review of the existing literature dealing with efficiency in the water industry in England 
and Wales as well as abroad. The model specification is set out in section 4. Section 5 
focuses on the input and output variables along with the arguments that support their 
choice, while section 6 specifies the environmental and regulatory factors. Empirical 
results are presented and discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes and briefly notes 
some policy implications. 
2 Regulation of the water industry 
At the privatization of the industry in 1989, the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWA) 
were transferred to the private sector with the functions of water supply, sewerage 
collection and sewage disposal, and they became Water and Sewerage Companies 
(WaSCs). The responsibility for drinking quality and environment regulation was passed to 
independent agencies, respectively, the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) and the 
National Rivers Authority, the latter absorbed into the Environment Agency (EA) in 1996. 
The then current integrated structure of the water and sewerage industry was thus almost 
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entirely preserved, with the exception of quality regulation functions which were 
considered more opportunely managed by public agencies (Hunt and Lynk, 1995). 
These ten privatized companies, along with the 29 already privately-owned water only 
companies, formed the England and Wales water and sewerage industry. The industry 
structure is concentrated, with the ten WaSCs providing both water and sewerage services 
in England and Wales, and accounting for 78% in terms of water supplied to the 
population and 85% in terms of served area (Saal and Parker, 2000). Given the large 
amount of the assets transferred to the private sector, and the (then) monopolistic nature of 
the established companies, the function of regulating prices was given to an independent 
agency, the Office of Water Services (OFWAT), whose main task is to set price in a way 
that encourages the companies to generate investment funds, enhance their efficiency level 
and fulfill programs for achieving high quality and environmental standards. 
Since privatization in 1989, the England and Wales water and sewerage industry has 
been subject to a regulatory regime based on price-cap regulation. This is a substitute for 
competition and is implemented by allowing companies to change prices according to the 
inflation rate (RPI, Retail Price Index), plus or minus a K factor decided by the regulator 
(OFWAT).1 This factor is composed of a negative component that accounts for the 
potential increase in efficiency that the regulator judges to be achievable (X-efficiency) and 
a positive component that is set to accommodate the large capital investment program of 
the companies. The price determinations are also based on a comparative performance 
assessment (yardstick competition). This system allows the regulator partially to 
circumvent the lack of information that typically characterizes the relationship between 
regulator and regulatees. Once prices are set, if firms manage to deliver service at a lower 
average cost than that assumed by the regulator, they keep the resulting benefits. The 
regulator can thus provide firms with the incentive to increase their efficiency and then 
return part of the realized cost savings to the customers through a subsequent reduction in 
prices. Price cap regulation is regarded as a higher-powered incentive scheme than rate of 
return regulation. The attempt to increase efficiency should lead to a reduction in the use of 
the resources to produce a specified output (that is, increased technical efficiency), and/or 
to a change in input mix, given the relative input prices, in order to minimize overall cost 
(that is, increased allocative efficiency). The aim of the paper is to analyze the trend of 
both the efficiency components during the regulated period from 1992-93 to 2004-05 and 
investigate whether the regulatory price reviews succeeded in the purpose of encouraging 
convergence towards higher efficiency. 
Following the first price control set by the Government at privatization in 1989, new 
price reviews have been set in 1994, 1999 and 2004 at intervals of five years.2 Given the 
data available, we will be able to analyze the impact of the 1994 and 1999 price reviews. 
                                                 
1 The first price control, for the period 1989 to 1994, was set by the Government. OFWAT has set the 
subsequent ones. 
2 In reality, the price cap in 1989 was set for a ten-year period, with an opportunity for the regulator to hold 
an interim determination after five years, which the regulator implemented. A debate rose regarding the 
desirability of maintaining a five-year cyclical review as the firms may have greater incentive to outperform 
the regulatory targets in the initial years of the five-year price control period in order to keep the benefits for 
a longer time before passing them to the customers through the successive price regulation. A longer price 
setting period might induce the firms to outperform the regulatory assumptions for a higher number of years. 
In 1999, OFWAT proposed a rolling incentive mechanism which it believed would have strengthened the 
firms’ incentive to cost reduction, allowing them keeping the benefits for a full-five years period, irrespective 
of when the target outperform was made. 
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Following privatization, prices for the water and sewerage service rose, on average, by 
almost 30% during the years up to the 1994 price review (Saal and Parker, 2000), thus 
providing firms with the financial resources necessary to sustain their capital investments. 
The 1994 price review set an average real annual increase of 1.5% up to 1999, with the 
expectation of a further real increase by 0.6% per year over the following five years 
(OFWAT, 1994). However, with the 1999 price review, the regulator reduced prices by 
12.3%, on average, for the first year of the new period. The average annual real reduction 
over the five years as a whole was 2%.3 
The 2004 price review, however, did not continue in this way, as it allowed an average 
annual increase over the whole five-year period 2004-2008 of 4.3%. 
The 1999 review thus, signaled a change in regulatory policy and concentrated the 
greatest part of the price reduction in one year. This raises the question of whether this 
would motivate firms to achieve higher levels of efficiency growth.4 A standard answer to 
this question may be that a price cap, which makes prices exogenous for a specified period, 
should provide broadly similar incentives for cost reduction however challenging the 
targets. However, it is also known that a fixed term price control furnishes weaker 
incentives for efficiency towards the end of the control period, as a result of the so-called 
“ratchet effect” – the tendency for regulators to use cost performance at the end of the 
control period as a basis for setting prices for the next period. If the regulator not only 
extrapolates from the level of costs when setting the next price cap but also notes their rate 
of decline, a firm may be reluctant to put in a very sparkling performance in any price 
control period in case it receives tougher cost reduction targets in the next period. More 
demanding targets may elicit different behavior in this regard, by removing the option on 
pain of the firm failing to make a profit of eking out cost reductions over time. 
At the same time, privatization should have removed the implicit distortion found in 
public firms, such as the overuse of employment for social and political reasons, so 
allowing the regulation policy being more effective. We examine what the data tell us 
about the importance of these various effects. 
3 Previous empirical literature 
In this section, we present a brief description of previous empirical studies that have been 
conducted on the economic analysis of the water and the integrated water and sewerage 
industry, in both the UK and other countries. 
The first point of interest concerns the analysis of cost efficiency. As far as the UK 
experience is concerned, a few early papers attempted to evaluate the firms’ cost efficiency 
and total factor productivity after the privatization of the industry, as well as to establish 
the impact of regulation. 
Stewart (1993, 1994) investigated water and sewerage costs separately, using an 
econometric frontier approach. The results are shown to depend on the distributional 
assumption employed in the econometric specification. 
                                                 
3 After the first price reduction, the regulator set a further decrease by –0.4% for the financial year 2001-02 
and increases by +0.2%, +1.3% and +1.7% for the last three years. These figures are averages across the 
industry. 
4 For a discussion of the impact of price controls, see Armstrong and Sappington (2007). 
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Ashton (2000a) analyzed the firm-specific cost efficiency conditions of the UK water 
and sewerage privatized companies as combined entities over the period between 1987 and 
1997, using a translog variable cost specification. This study finds a moderate level of 
dispersion of average inefficiency, which could be indicative of the diversity both of 
operating environment and of performance in the sector. In another contribution, Ashton 
(2000b) identified the dynamic aspects of performance of the privatized WaSCs between 
1989 and 1997, exploring the characteristics of the total factor productivity growth. The 
results highlight a decline in total factor productivity and technical change, thus drawing 
the attention to the modest impact of privatization since 1989. 
A joint consideration of the effect of privatization and regulation on economic 
efficiency was carried out by Saal and Parker (2000). This study modeled the ten WaSCs, 
using observations between 1985 and 1999, using a multi-output translog total cost 
function. The findings suggest that technological change has been labor-saving and capital-
augmenting. The hypotheses of different total cost growth rate after privatization and the 
1994 price review were tested. While the former hypothesis was rejected, revealing that no 
effect could be found due to privatization, the second one was not, suggesting that the main 
source of cost efficiency might be found in industry regulation. In another contribution, 
Saal and Parker (2001) employed labor and total factor productivity (TFP) indices and 
rejected the hypothesis of increasing overall productivity due to privatization, even though 
labor productivity showed a significant growth rate. As they argued, this may be ascribed 
to a decreasing trend in capital productivity, due to capital for labor substitution in the 
post-privatization period and the failure of the regulator to counteract the tendency towards 
over-investment.5 They also found that, although gains in labor productivity mainly took 
place after the 1994 price review, the overall productivity growth declined after 1994. 
Further results are found in Saal and Parker (2004), where no evidence is found that 
privatization led to a TFP growth but there is some evidence of improving TFP owing to 
the 1994 price control. In a more extensive study, Saal and Reid (2004), employing a 
quality adjusted translog variable cost function, showed that while the 1994 price review 
improved operating cost productivity, the 1999 price review did not provide evidence of a 
further productivity growth rate. Saal et al (forthcoming) adopt an input distance function 
approach in order to decompose productivity growth into technical change, efficiency 
change and scale efficiency change. This study claims that while technical change occurred 
as a consequence of privatization, efficiency improvements did not come about because the 
regulatory price control was lax. Bottasso and Conti (2003) also found evidence that 
operating cost inefficiency was decreasing and that the inefficiency differentials were 
narrowing for the whole English and Welsh water industry between 1995 and 2001. 
Looking elsewhere the role of regulatory policy has been recently examined by Aubert 
and Reynaud (2005) for the Wisconsin water system. The particular Wisconsin regulation 
scheme, based on the simultaneous presence of price-cap and rate-of-return schemes in the 
same region at the same time, allowed the authors to compare the effect of the two 
different regulatory regimes. Using a stochastic cost frontier approach (where the 
inefficiency error term is modeled as a function of the regulatory type), they surprisingly 
conclude that the most efficient utilities are those operating under a rate-of-return regime6 
                                                 
5 This process is mainly explained by the authors in terms of the environmental constraints that forced the 
privatised companies into extensive investment programmes. 
6 Rate-of-return regulation emerged for limiting the profits of franchised monopolies. It consists in letting the 
firms to freely choose their price under the constraint that return on capital should be fair but below a pre-
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and subject to extensive information gathering by the regulator. Price-cap regulation was 
shown to be a higher-powered incentive mechanism than a hybrid regulatory scheme with 
less information available for the regulator. The need for the regulator to gather 
information in order to enforce an effective yardstick competition system is also 
emphasized by Anwandter and Ozuna (2002), in the context of the public water industry 
reform in Mexico. 
Evidence of poor results of private ownership, given the monopolistic nature of the 
service, can be found in other studies. Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983), using a sample of 
government and privately-owned U.S. water suppliers suggest that, contrary to public 
choice or property rights theories, no evidence could be found of significant differences in 
the cost functions of public versus private utilities. Bhattacharyya et al (1994) and 
Bhattacharyya et al (1995a and 1995b) modeled the cost structure of a sample of U.S. 
water utilities embodying the potential input allocative distortion attributable to the 
ownership nature.7 The main results highlight a better efficiency performance of the public 
firms at least when they are large. Lambert et al (1993) examined the question of the 
ownership structure for U.S. water system using a linear programming approach. They 
found no difference between private and public categories in selecting the least cost 
combination of inputs. 
An alternative method for modeling the technology and assessing efficiency 
performance is via DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), although DEA was criticized by 
OFWAT in 1994 as a means of setting price limits. A comprehensive description of the use 
of DEA for regulatory purposes is provided in Thanassoulis (2000a and 2000b), where 
DEA methodology has been employed with the aim of estimating the potential operating 
cost savings for the water function. These studies also address the issue of how to represent 
the technology. Other applications of DEA can be found in Tupper and Resende (2004) in 
the context of the Brazilian water and sewerage system and in Coelli and Walding (2006) 
in the context of the Australian water industry. The former, in particular, provides a second 
stage correction of the DEA efficiency scores in order to account for regional operational 
heterogeneities (density effects and water losses). Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) carried 
out a comparison between regression analysis and DEA for the UK water industry using 
1994-95 data. This study concludes that DEA analysis could be useful in identifying 
possible reasons for poor performance but it is to be used with caution where large datasets 
are not available. 
Summarizing, as far as the UK context is concerned, analysis of the impact of 
regulation has been generally limited to the 1994 price review – with the exception of the 
study by Saal and Reid (2004) – and the findings show a scant evidence of efficiency 
growth. The 1999 price review tightened the regulation scheme, imposing for the first time 
a price reduction. The dataset used in this study covers the period from 1992-93 to 2004-05 
for the ten WaSCs, and although it does not allow us directly to consider the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                    
specified level. This method allows prices to increase for covering costs and, in such a way, it is expected to 
provide less incentives to pursue cost efficiency. 
7 In these studies, the authors employed a generalised or shadow cost function approach (Kumbhakar, 1992; 
Parker, 1995, Maietta, 2000; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003) which accommodates the possible violation that 
arises when costs are minimised with respect to internal (shadow) prices rather than market input prices. The 
input price distortions bring about allocative inefficiency. The application of this methodology may be 
particularly suitable for public utilities, as they are often subject to the public control. It is also to be noted 
that an alternative solution to the problem of not exogenous input prices consists in the use of an input-
distance function (see Saal and Parker, 2004), since this method does not require information on prices. 
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privatization on efficiency, it allows us to test the effects of two subsequent price reviews. 
This makes it possible to address the question of whether tightening the regulatory regime 
succeeded in improving the cost efficiency of the industry. Furthermore, from a 
methodological viewpoint, this study seeks to shed some light on allocative efficiency, 
which has received so far limited attention in the empirical literature. 
4 Model specification 
In 1957, Farrell introduced a methodology for the measurement of the economic 
efficiency, as well as its decomposition into both technical and allocative components. 
From an input-oriented perspective8, technical efficiency (TE) is associated with the ability 
to produce on the efficiency boundary of the production possibility set given a 
predetermined quantity of output (point E in figure 1), whereas allocative efficiency (AE) 
reflects the ability to produce at a given output level using the optimal input mix (point E’ 
in figure 1). 
 
 X2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Global, technical and allocative measures of cost efficiency 
Note: Two inputs (x1 and x2) and one output technology. Technical efficiency = OE/OD; Allocative 
efficiency = OF/OE; Economic efficiency = OF/OD = (OF/OE)×(OE/OD) 
Let N [with n = 1,…, N] be the number of Decision Making Units (DMUs), xi the i-th 
input [i = 1…I] and yj the j-th output [j =1…J]. Then, the input-oriented radial measure of 
technical efficiency (TEI) is calculated by solving, for each DMU, the following linear 
programming problem (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978; Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
1984), under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS)9:  
                                                 
8 In principle, the economic efficiency may be measured using an input or an output-oriented approach. In 
the first case, the input use is minimized given a certain amount of output, while in the second the output is 
maximized for a given level of inputs. Generally, the adoption of an input-oriented framework is preferred 
when public utilities are considered as the demand of service the suppliers must provide may be seen as 
exogenous (see Torres and Morrison Paul, 2006, for an application with endogenous output). 
9 For a comprehensive description of DEA models, see Thanassoulis (2001) and Coelli et al (2005). The 
VRS (Variable Returns to Scale) model here adopted ensures – through the convexity constraint  that a DMU 
X1 
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where Si and Sj indicate the slacks (that is, non-radial input reduction measures) for i-th 
input and j-th output respectively, ε  is an infinitesimal and λn is an intensity variable 
assigned to each DMU, which assumes non-zero value for the efficient DMUs (that is, 
those lying on the efficiency frontier) which are the peers for the inefficient ones. The 
scalar TEI ranges from 0 to 1, being equal to unity when full technical efficiency occurs. 
The allocative efficiency measure allows us to assess the potential to reduce costs 
further by means of a variation in the input mix, consistently with the existing technology. 
The DMU’s cost-minimising input demand (xi*) may be calculated by solving, for each 
DMU, the following VRS linear programming problem (Coelli et al, 2005): 
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Hence, the allocative efficiency measure is calculated as the ratio of minimum 
attainable cost to the cost corresponding to a situation wherein all inputs are contracted by 
the same proportion (1-TEI) in order to eliminate technical inefficiency, as follows: 
 
 
 
 
( )∑
∑
=
=
∗
= I
1i
iIi
I
1i
ii
x TEw
xw
AE (3)  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
is compared with units operating at a similar size. In this way, this model allows separating the pure 
managerial inefficiency from the inefficiency entirely due to an incorrect size setting. 
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The basic DEA model described here evaluates economic efficiency using traditional 
input and output variables but it does not consider the potential role that environmental 
factors may have on producers’ performance.10 
Several models have been developed in order to incorporate environmental effects into 
a DEA-based performance evaluation.11 One possible approach is to include the 
environmental variables directly into the linear programming formulation either as non-
discretionary inputs, outputs or neutral variables, according to the circumstances (Ferrier 
and Lovell, 1990). This requires that further linear programming constraints be included. 
As a consequence, only few environmental variables can simultaneously be taken into 
account to avoid excessive restriction of the reference set, hence reduction of the 
discriminatory power of DEA. 
Another possible approach is to adopt a multi-stage DEA analysis aimed at ensuring 
that the comparison is made among units which operate under similar environmental 
conditions, so eliminating the environmental effects from the single producer’s 
performance assessment. In this way, the evaluation of the impact of the environmental 
effects may be carried out either when an a priori direction of the influence of the 
environmental variable upon efficiency is known (Banker and Morey, 1986) or not 
(Charnes et al, 1981). 
Both these approaches are, however, deterministic and so they fail to take into 
consideration the effects of statistical noise on efficiency performance. Another group of 
models is based on two-stage mixed approaches, which involve solving a DEA problem in 
a first stage using traditional input and output variables, in order to calculate initial 
efficiency measures. The efficiency scores are then regressed upon a set of environmental 
variables in a second stage, the objective being to determine the signs, as well as the 
significance of the coefficients of the environmental variables and to consider the impact 
of noise. McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) and Bhattacharyya et al (1997) tried to account 
for noise using the residuals of the regression to adjust the first-stage DEA efficiency 
scores. Fried et al (1999) introduced a three-stage approach where the initial DEA 
efficiency scores are regressed upon a vector of environmental factors. Predicted values of 
the impact of the environmental effects can be then computed. In a third stage, the original 
data are adjusted to account for the effect of environmental variables and DEA is re-run in 
order to obtain new DEA scores unaffected by environmental characteristics. This 
approach, however, is unable to account for the role of statistical noise on efficiency.12 
In order to embody the action of both environmental variables and statistical noise 
upon efficiency, we adopted a novel three-stage approach proposed by Fried et al (2002). 
By adopting, a mixed approach which combines DEA and Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA), their model makes it possible to obtain a measure of the intrinsic managerial ability 
                                                 
10 Some examples of environmental factors that may affect firms’ performance include characteristics, such 
as ownership nature, geographical location, regulatory regime and so on (Fried et al, 1999). 
11 See Coelli et al (2005) for wide details on these models. 
12 In general, it is important to recognize that – as noted in the DEA literature – all the multi-stage mixed 
approaches may present problems if the variables used in the first stage (inputs and outputs) were highly 
correlated with the set of variables used in the second stage; the resulting second-stage coefficients would 
then be biased. Moreover, whether in the first DEA stage some relevant inputs or outputs were omitted, the 
technology would be incorrectly specified and the efficiency scores inappropriate for use in the second-stage 
regression. 
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shown in organizing firms’ operations, separately both from the impacts of the 
environmental characteristics in which production takes place and from random noise. 
Note that, although the Fried et al (2002) approach was originally proposed to model 
DEA-based technical inefficiency measures, it has been extended in this study to 
incorporate also allocative inefficiency. The model is briefly summarized here. 
According to Fried et al (2002), the difference between the observed input-specific 
usage, xi (i = 1,…, I), and the optimal projected value onto the efficient boundary, TEI × xi 
(where the technical efficiency score, TEI, is derived from the DEA linear programming 
(1)), is viewed as the excess use (or over-use) of the i-th input. Such excess use may be 
explained by pure managerial technical inefficiency, environmental effects and random 
noise. In this light, these input-specific overuse measures derived for all the observations 
from the first stage have been regressed over a set of environmental variables using SFA, 
as described below13: 
 
( ) ( ) uβz;fxTEx iIi ++=− (4)  I1,..., i         v =∀
 
where z = [z1n,…, zKn] is a vector of K environmental variables outside the control of 
managers, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, u is a non-negative half-normal 
distributed N+(0,σu2) error term14, which captures the over-use of the i-th input brought 
about by pure managerial inefficiency, and v is the usual normally distributed N(0,σv2) 
error term.15 
As in equation (4), the i-th input allocative distortion, obtained as difference between 
the technically optimum input level and the cost-minimizing input demand (xi*), has been 
regressed using SFA on a set of variables which enable to control for the impact of 
environmental factors. In this case, as the input distortion could be either positive or 
negative, we considered, on the left-hand side of equation (5), the absolute value of the 
difference16, as follows: 
 
( ) vuβz;fxx TE iiI ++=− ∗ (5)  I1,...,i           =∀
 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that in the Fried et al (2002) method total (radial plus non-radial) measures of input 
slacks (interpreted as input over-use measures) are regressed against a set of observable environmental 
variables using SFA, where total input slacks are calculated, following the linear programming problem (1), 
as xi–(TEI × xi - Si) = xi×(1-TEI)+Si (∀ i = 1,…, I). Differently, our second stage estimates are solely based on 
radial – rather than total – input slacks, expressed as xi - TEI × xi (∀ i = 1,…, I). The attempt to disentangle 
technical from allocative inefficiency led us to include non-radial input slacks, Si, into the allocative 
distortion equations, as the potential non-radial contraction of specific inputs reflects the adjustment of an 
inappropriate input mix (Coelli et al, 2005; Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). 
14 In this paper, a half-normal distribution has been adopted rather than a more general truncated-normal 
specification of the inefficiency term, in order to minimise computational problems. Although the truncated-
normal specification is more general, we do not think that this assumption creates serious problems. 
15 For completeness, in Fried et al (2002), a third stage is defined in which DEA is re-run once original data 
are adjusted in order to remove the impact of environmental variables and noise. Since the calculation of 
firms’ ranking is beyond the aim of this paper, we decided to skip this stage. 
16 The left-hand side difference in equation (5) should be considered as a mere distortion measure as it only 
allows considering if distortion is systematically explained by external or internal factors, without 
distinguishing between input-specific over or under-utilisation. 
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where z, β and v have the same meaning as above. In this case, the inefficiency term u≥0 
should be interpreted as the intrinsic inability of the managers to arrange the input mix, 
given the relative input prices, in order to attain minimum cost. 
One advantage of this methodology with respect to the stochastic cost frontier 
approach is that it allows separating the technical and the allocative efficiency components 
in an easy way. For each component then, it involves the estimation of I separate second-
stage equations, thus letting features of operating environment, pure managerial 
inefficiency and statistical noise exert different impact across inputs. In addition, it allows 
separating the technical from the allocative efficiency.  
In order to capture the (technical and allocative) inefficiency trend over time, the 
inefficiency error terms, u, have been modeled, either in equations (4) or (5), according to 
the time-varying inefficiency model defined in Battese and Coelli (1992): 
 
( )( ) nTTtηnt ueu ×= −− (6)  
 
where n = 1,…, N denotes the firm, t = 1…T denotes the time, T indicates the final year of 
the time series for each firm, η is a parameter to be estimated and uT is assumed to have an 
i.i.d. half-normal distribution N+(0,σu2). A positive value of η implies a downward trend in 
the managerial efficiency term over time while a negative value implies an upward trend. 
Thus, the trend of the managerial inefficiency for each input, along with its statistical 
significance, is directly derived from the data once both environmental factors and noise 
have been removed. 
As regards this point, it should be acknowledged that a restrictive assumption applies 
in the sense that all the firms are assumed to be characterized by a similar trend of the 
inefficiency term over time. This could be seen as a regrettable restriction of the model. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that all the England and Wales WaSCs share very similar 
regulatory conditions and, as a consequence, the restrictions enforced by the central 
regulator are likely to guide firms in a common direction. 
5 Specification of the technology using DEA 
A fundamental stage in DEA is the correct identification of the multiple-input multiple-
output bundles, so that firms can be compared taking into consideration all the activities 
they carry out (Thanassoulis, 2001). 
With respect to the industry under investigation, the first activity concerns the 
extraction and treatment of water from rivers or boreholes. Once water has been abstracted 
and treated to meet quality parameters, it is pumped into the mains and delivered to 
household or non-household customers through the distribution network. A second set of 
activities deals with the collection of waste water through the sewage network and the 
disposal of the effluent in the sewage treatment works so that water can be returned to its 
natural environment. There is a body of literature that attempts to model water and 
sewerage technology and cost structure (among the others, see the studies of Fabbri and 
Fraquelli, 2000; Garcia and Thomas, 2001; Mizutani and Urakami, 2001; Torres and 
Morrison Paul, 2006). The choice of inputs and outputs described below is generally 
consistent with this literature. 
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Using this scheme, we identified four outputs, each of them able to capture a specific 
resource-consuming phase of the overall transformation process. 
First, the total volume of delivered potable plus non potable water (WDEL) has been 
used as the output of the abstraction and treatment phase. This is a conventional measure 
of the water production activity. An alternative measure, also tested in this work without 
significant changes in the results, is the distribution input, which is defined as the amount 
of water entering the distribution system, including the water losses along the distribution 
network. 
Second, the total number of household and non-household water service-connected 
properties (WPROP) has been adopted as proxy for the scale of the distribution activity. 
Third, the total number of household and non-household sewerage service-connected 
properties (SPROP) has been used as to capture the scope of the waste water collection 
activity. 
Finally, the physical amount of waste water (WASTW) has been included as output of 
the effluent disposal and treatment activity. 
One important characteristic of water companies is that they must comply with 
drinking water quality standards (issued by DWI) and river quality standards (issued by 
EA). Thus, water quality could be regarded as an additional output since the fulfillment of 
quality programs is usually highly expensive. However, instead of considering water 
quality as a separate output we adopted the solution, suggested by Saal and Parker (2000), 
of adjusting the WDEL variable by a firm-specific compliance index with drinking water 
quality standards and WASTW by a firm-specific water quality compliance index with river 
quality standards. Both compliance indices have been standardized with respect to the 
average England and Wales compliance levels.17 
In order to model the production process, we used three inputs: labour, other operating 
expenditures and capital. All the variables have been expressed in 2002-03 prices. 
Labour input (EMPL) is measured by the total cost of non-manual and manual 
manpower which is directly attributable to the water and sewerage businesses. In order to 
obtain a proxy for the physical use of labour, we adjusted this variable by a firm-specific 
labour price index.18 
The other operating expenditures variable (OTHEX) has been calculated by subtracting 
the cost of labour from the total operating expenditures (OPEX) for the appointed water 
and sewerage businesses, and it includes the cost of materials and consumables, hired 
services and energy (see Ashton 2000a and 2000b for a similar approach). Since the price 
of energy followed a decreasing trend both in real and nominal terms – the fall in the price 
of energy for the industrial sector is about 20% in current terms and 60% in nominal terms 
from 1993 to 2005 – it was impossible to deflate this aggregate value using a common 
price index. Therefore, we deflated the materials and services cost and the energy cost 
through two different indices. The former has been adjusted by the conventional RPI 
                                                 
17 Consistent time series of drinking water and river quality compliance indices have been taken from the 
DWI and the EA annual reports. 
18 The labour price index is based on the trend of the average wage for each firm. In turn, the average wage 
has been calculated dividing the total employment cost by the number of full total equivalent employees (the 
information has been taken from the annual reports of the companies). This is the best available proxy of the 
yearly average wage for the water and sewerage industry. The resulting wages have been then compared with 
the data from the New Earnings Survey and this confirmed their validity. We preferred to use this 
specification of the labour input instead of directly using the number of employees since the latter sometimes 
relates to the whole group, so including workers of non appointed businesses. 
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index; the latter by an energy price index for the industrial sector derived from the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI).19 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) has been included in the DEA specification because of 
the capital-intensive nature of the water and sewerage industry (Saal and Parker, 2000, 
2001; Saal et al, forthcoming; Coelli and Walding, 2006). The annual capital consumption 
has been calculated by multiplying the yearly monetary value of capital, given by the 
annual average modern equivalent asset (MEA) estimation of the replacement cost of fixed 
tangible assets20, by a depreciation rate. This latter was derived on the basis of the current 
depreciation and infrastructure renewal charges21, directly attributed to water and sewerage 
businesses, divided by the average MEA gross capital value in the same year. In this way, 
the consumption of capital, as captured by CAPEX, is proportional to the stock of capital. 
Some descriptive statistics on output and input variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Variation 
coefficient Min Max 
WDEL (Ml/d) 1072.5 560.1 0.522 288.9 2179.4 
WPROP (000) 1895.3 1016.6 0.536 455.8 3684.1 
SPROP (000) 2123.5 1292.9 0.608 565.9 5272.3 
WASTW (Ml/d) 1036.0 703.2 0.678 246.6 3020.0 
EMPL (£m) 34.1 20.7 0.607 7.7 137.5 
OTHEX| (£m) 226.1 108.6 0.480 69.2 446.1 
CAPEX (£m) 181.4 85.7 0.472 38.2 361.7 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
In order to derive the contribution of allocative efficiency to overall economic 
efficiency, input price data are needed. A deflation procedure based on 2002-03 has been 
followed, in order to isolate the real movements of prices. 
A price of labor has been calculated by dividing the overall cost of employment by the 
number of full time equivalent employees (see note 18) and then deflating the resulting 
values by the RPI index. 
A price for other operating expenditures is problematic, given the heterogeneous nature 
of this input. We adopted a weighted average of RPI and a real price index of energy for 
                                                 
19 Different energy price indices are available. We considered the energy price index for industrial use 
expressed in current terms and including the climate levy charge for UK. 
20 Following Stone and Webster (2004), the MEA values available in the OFWAT dataset have been deflated 
using the Construction Price Index (COPI) as deflation index instead of the RPI index. Furthermore, the 
MEA annual values have been corrected in order to eliminate the impact due to AMP adjustments – that is, 
periodic capital value adjustments to bring assets to their current values according to their operational 
standards. This smoothing of the capital stock time series has been carried out considering the MEA value in 
the financial year 2002-03 as base and then adding (for the successive years) or subtracting (for the previous 
years) the amount of the annual net investments, calculated for each year at 2002-03 prices. 
21 The depreciation regime is different according to the type of asset. While above ground assets (like 
treatment plants, pumps, reservoirs, sewage disposal works) are depreciated, the underground assets are not 
directly depreciated but an infrastructure renewals charge is computed and included in the Profit and Loss 
statement. 
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the industrial sector, taken from DTI, where the weights are represented by the respective 
cost shares.22 
Finally, the price of capital has been computed as the percentage rate resulting from the 
sum of the above described depreciation (and infrastructure renewal) rate and the 
opportunity cost of capital.23 The latter has been directly imputed from the regulatory 
assessment of the fair rate of return on the capital employed. According to OFWAT, the 
cost of capital cost was equal 5.5% up to 1999 and 4.75% for the subsequent years. 
In addition, it should be noted that the inclusion of four output variables ensures that 
the comparison is made among firms with similar customer density (where customer 
density is measured as volumes per customer) and similar relations between water and 
sewerage activities. Furthermore, comparison between firms which are similar in terms of 
network density (where network density is measured as customers per kilometre of 
network) is also indirectly accommodated. Low network density firms are generally more 
capital-intensive than high network density firms. Therefore, the joint consideration of 
operating and capital expenditures ensures that the comparison is made among firms with 
similar input ratios, that is, with comparable network density conditions (Coelli and 
Walding, 2006). 
6 Environmental and regulatory variables 
The efficiency of a firm could be affected by exogenous conditions that are not under the 
direct control of managers. These effects should be removed in an efficiency assessment. 
The exogenous variables we used in the second stage are of two types: environmental 
variables and policy variables. The former take account of the impact of the different 
characteristics of the network and of the area where the service is provided, thus control 
for heterogeneity among firms. The latter relate to regulatory policy and more specifically, 
the change in the economic environment that occurs after the introduction of new 
regulatory constraints. These variables are not differentiated by firms since the regulatory 
framework is common for the whole industry but they vary over time. 
The set of environmental variables should be such as to represent the exogenous 
characteristics of the whole range of activities. Our set of environmental variables is 
consistent with many of the above mentioned empirical studies. We now briefly describe 
these variables. 
                                                 
22 A better solution may have been to disentangle material and services from energy. In this latter case, the 
first choice for the energy price would have been a measure calculated by dividing the cost of power by the 
consumption of energy but unfortunately, no consumption value is available in the OFWAT dataset. The 
most natural alternative would have been to use an energy price index but in this case, we must have 
employed two price indices (the RPI index and the DTI energy price index) invariant across firms. On the 
contrary, the weighted average price index here adopted is variant, given that the cost shares vary across 
firms and years. 
The DTI real energy price index has been deflated using the GDP deflator. We recomputed the energy price 
time series index using the RPI index but no significant difference emerged. 
23 The notion of user cost of capital is based on the view that capital should be considered under both a 
physical and financial perspective. Indeed “…the capital cost the firm truly incurs is an implicit rental price 
… , which is the interest rate on the investment price, plus the deterioration involved, …” (Morrison Paul, 
1999, p.286). For a similar approach see also Mizutani and Urakami (2001). 
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The proportion of water abstracted from underground sources (SOURCE) reflects the 
different conditions of water production. A larger amount of abstraction from boreholes 
than from surface sources requires higher power consumption but at the same time, less 
treatment cost because of the higher purity of underground water. With regard to capital, a 
higher proportion of underground water requires more pumps while a higher proportion of 
surface water is associated to a larger number of treatment plants. For these reasons, we 
assign no a priori impact to this variable. 
The percentage of water losses (WLOSS) with respect to the overall distribution input 
is a general proxy for the operational condition of the distribution network. A higher 
proportion of losses implies more critical conditions of the network, thus a higher input use 
is expected. 
The water population density (WDENS) is calculated as the ratio between the 
population provided with water and the length of water distribution network. In a rough 
way, a higher density could also be associated to a greater proportion of household 
properties. In general, providing service to a more concentrated population is cheaper – per 
connection – than serving a dispersed population, since in this latter case more diversions 
of the network, more frequent maintenance and more energy are needed. 
The sewerage population density (SDENS) is calculated as the ratio between the 
equivalent sewerage population and the length of the sewerage network. A higher density 
could be associated to a high proportion of household properties connected. Analogous 
economies of density arguments, as described above for the water activity, apply even 
though a more ambiguous effect has been empirically found (see Tupper and Resende, 
2004).24 
Since sewerage population density could not entirely capture the effect due to the 
users’ composition, we also considered the trade effluent variable (TREFFL), which 
represents the proportion of industrial effluent in total waste water. In general, we would 
expect that more industrial effluent would impose higher input requirements, especially 
with respect to treatment cost and energy. 
Time trend (TIME) is included to account for technological progress/regress. The 
TIME variable is interpreted as a proxy for technological changes but not for changes in 
technical efficiency conditions, which are embodied in the one-sided distributed error 
component. Furthermore, as privately-owned firms are profit-maximizing agents, we 
would expect that technical progress was encouraged after privatization. 
Finally, regulatory variables have been introduced to take into account the potential 
impact of changes in the economic environment. Because there have been two price 
controls during the period under observation, we introduced in the model two distinct 
dummy variables, REG94 and REG99, which assume a value of one for the five years after 
respectively, 1994 and 1999.25 As noted above, the second regulatory intervention was 
more severe. Hence, we may expect a stronger input-reducing impact associated with the 
REG99 variable. 
The managerial (technical and allocative) inefficiency is embodied into the one-sided 
inefficiency error terms (u) in equations (4) and (5). The unidirectional efficiency trend is 
                                                 
24 The WDENS and SDENS variables are expected to capture more effects than those ones already 
accommodated by the multi-input DEA specification. WDENS and SDENS use the population rather than the 
number of customers and they are included to reflect the different operational characteristics associated to 
the network conformation. 
25 It should be noted that the allowed price changes took effect on 1 April 1995 and 1 April 2000. 
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directly estimated by the model. This inefficiency error component should be interpreted as 
the residual inefficiency of the firms if they faced the same environmental and noise 
conditions, and they operated in a neutral context with respect to regulatory policy and 
technical progress/regress. Thus, another reason has to be sought to explain the 
inefficiency terms level and trend. Since the water and sewerage companies were subjected 
to a privatization process in 1989, the change in ownership regime could be interpreted as 
driver of the managerial inefficiency trend. As stated above, private firms are usually 
viewed as focusing more on profit-maximizing (or cost-minimizing) behavior than public 
firms, so that they can be expected to make more effort for the rationalization of the input 
consumption. Moreover, the introduction of a yardstick competition regime in the period 
after privatization could have well worked as an incentive mechanism as it allowed a 
firm’s performance to be judged in relation to the performance of the other units.26 At least 
in the long run, this could be expected to narrow the efficiency differentials and to induce 
the firms to reduce costs. For these reasons, we should expect a positive efficiency trend 
that is, a convergence towards an optimal use of inputs from both a technical and an 
allocative viewpoint.27 
7 Empirical results 
7.1 DEA technical and allocative efficiency results 
The first stage DEA results are shown in Table 2. The mean technical efficiency score is 
equal to 0.909, which indicates that the average firm could reduce all inputs 
simultaneously by 9.1%, still producing the same amount of output. 
The minimum value is 0.657, indicating that there were substantial differences among 
firms. The mean allocative efficiency score is 0.810, a very low level, which indicates that, 
even if technical efficiency were achieved, a 19.0% excess of total operating (capital plus 
non capital) cost over minimum cost there would still exist, which could be eliminated by 
adjusting the inappropriate input mix. The minimum score is 0.349, revealing the presence 
of very large allocative distortions.28 Moreover, the variability of the allocative scores is 
higher that that of technical efficiency. These results indicate that a major part of the 
                                                 
26 OFWAT has placed considerable emphasis on yardstick competition in price cap setting. By using the 
results of econometric studies of the regulated firms which relate costs to internal input organisation and 
environmental variables, OFWAT is able to set out “catch-up” efficiency targets that contribute to the 
determination of the price cap for individual companies. The determination process also makes adjustments 
for events that are beyond the companies’ control and rewards or penalises service quality performance. The 
final decision on price caps thus reflects  OFWAT’s assessment of each company’s performance relative to 
the industry as a whole. 
27 While the regulation and time variables have been used as explanatory factors for both the technical and 
allocative frameworks, the set of operational characteristics have been consider to have only a technical 
nature. This is consistent with several papers within the shadow cost function approach literature stream 
which only use regulation, ownership and time as potential explanatory factors for allocative distortions. 
28 Actually, this value appears very low but when we move to the first decile the allocative efficiency level 
increases to 0.622, thus revealing a more credible assessment of the allocative inefficiency in such extreme 
situations. Anyway, very low level of allocative (as well as technical) efficiency could also be found in many 
empirical researches using DEA (see, for instance, Coelli et al (2002)). 
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economic efficiency is attributable to allocative distortions in input utilization, rather than 
to technical inefficiency. 
 TE (1993-2005) AE(1993-2005) 
Mean 0.909 0.810 
Min 0.657 0.349 
Standard deviation 0.103 0.147 
Table 2: Average technical and allocative efficiency 
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Figure 2: DEA technical and allocative efficiency trends 
Technical and allocative efficiency trends are depicted in Figure 2. Technical 
efficiency initially falls in an interval between 0.88 and 0.90 and then shows an upwards 
shift to around 0.94 after 1999. The average efficiency value before 1999 price review is 
0.891, while its average value during the 1999 price setting period is 0.940. Thus, it seems 
that the 1999 price review stimulated a technical efficiency progress of around 5%, 
whereas 1994 price review had no effect. Allocative efficiency, by contrast, shows a 
continuously increasing trend which does not seem to depend on regulatory interventions. 
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This upwards trend raised allocative efficiency from 0.650 to more than 0.900, indicating 
that the firms chiefly addressed their efforts to reducing economic inefficiency through a 
better input mix settlement. 
The input-specific allocative distortion measures, calculated as difference between 
technical efficient input levels and corresponding cost-minimizing values, are depicted in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Average input allocative distortion trends 
The graphs allow comments in terms of both sign and trend of the distortion. Figure 3 
shows an initial systematic over-utilization of labor and under-utilization of capital 
(respectively of more than 80% and -25% compared with the technically optimum value), 
which tend to gradually cancel out during time. This result is consistent with previous 
evidence in Saal and Parker (2000, 2001). One explanation is that this could stem from the 
 442
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.6, Issue 4 – December 2007 
 
previous public nature of these firms. Pint (1991) and Boycko et al (1996) ascribe over – 
employment to public firms’ social – rather than cost-minimizing – objectives. 
As regards capital, an explanation for under-capitalization before privatization is 
capital rationing. Indeed, one important reason for privatization was to remove from 
Government the liability of funding the water industry’s investment program. The 
extensive capital investments required after privatization in order to expand or renew the 
network, as well as to meet higher quality and environmental standards enhanced the 
capital stock and reduced allocative inefficiency. The capital allocative distortion trend 
seems to have been affected by the 1999 price review. However, this could also be due to 
the reduction in the cost of capital. Anyway, as distinct from Saal and Parker (2001), we do 
not find evidence of over-capitalization. 
As regards the OTHEX variable, the results point out an initial over-utilization 
followed by a negative allocative distortion. This could be due to the flexibility of this 
input. Another reason could be the rapid reduction in energy prices experienced in the 
same period. This could have increased the cost-minimizing level of energy. However, as 
energy consumption is quite rigidly linked to the capital endowment, it seems difficult to 
interpret the rising distortion as allocative inefficiency. 
7.2 Input-specific environmental and regulatory impact 
In this section, we will discuss the impact of the environmental and regulatory factors on 
input-specific efficiency performance. 
The results from the second stage input-based SFA equations with respect to technical 
inefficiency are presented in Table 3. 
 
 EMPL OTHEX CAPEX 
 Parameter t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio  
SOURCE -7.249 (-2.936) *** -61.916 (-3.457) *** -84.907 (-5.633) ***
WLOSS 18.271 (3.346) *** 97.948 (2.652) *** 29.288 (1.039)  
WDENS -37.978 (-2.813) *** -222.181 (-2.338) ** -98.553 (-0.794)  
SDENS 0.292 (0.036)  -17.047 (-0.333)  -9.366 (-0.233)  
TREFFL 5.662 (0.341)  -5.564 (-0.050)  -155.325 (-1.601) * 
REG94 -0.645 (-0.900)  -2.844 (-0.622)  -4.124 (-1.190)  
REG99 -1.893 (-2.575) *** -13.362 (-2.857) *** -10.427 (-2.848) ***
TIME 0.588 (3.436) *** 3.815 (3.385) *** 1.886 (1.962) ** 
γ 0.855 (11.080) *** 0.889 (14.341) *** 0.957 (41.718) ***
η 0.071 (5.619) *** 0.064 (4.963) *** 0.034 (3.322) ***
Likelihood -284.856   -526.279   -497.353   
Table 3: Environmental and regulatory impact on input-specific technical 
inefficiency 
Note: Estimates marked with (***) are statistically significant at 1% level; estimates marked with (**) are 
significant at 5% level; estimates marked with (*) are significant at 10% level 
The SOURCE variable is always associated with negative and significant parameters, 
indicating that a greater proportion of underground water has beneficial effects on the 
 443
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.6, Issue 4 – December 2007 
 
input requirements. The WLOSS variable shows a positive and significant parameter with 
respect to EMPL and OTHEX equations, so indicating that more critical operational 
characteristics of the quasi-fixed input (that is, the network) produce higher inefficiency in 
the use of variable inputs. The negative and significant impact of the WDENS variable on 
EMPL and OTHEX reflects a favorable condition associated to a higher water network 
density. The SDENS does not exhibit the same property even though the parameter is 
negative in two cases (for similar results, see Tupper and Resende (2004)). The TREFFL 
variable is generally associated with statistically insignificant parameters. Only the 
negative impact on CAPEX is marginally significant (at 10% level), thus indicating that a 
higher proportion of industrial effluent in total waste water, though it imposes – ceteris 
paribus – higher levels of capital, is associated to better performance in the use of this 
input. 
Turning to the regulatory dummies, it should be note that REG94 has generally the 
expected (negative) sign but it is not significant, whereas REG99 is negative and always 
strongly significant. This result could be explained by invoking the change in the 
regulatory policy that took place in 1999. Finally, TIME is significant but with a positive 
sign. This evidence does not allow us to accept the hypothesis of positive technical 
progress (see Ashton 2000b) but rather supports a picture of more intensive input 
requirements associated with an infrastructure and non-infrastructure investment process 
designed to provide higher quality services to customers. 
 
 EMPL OTHEX CAPEX 
1993 1.280 1.380 1.496 
1994 1.267 1.335 1.417 
1995 1.287 1.334 1.408 
1996 1.276 1.314 1.385 
1997 1.277 1.289 1.376 
1998 1.262 1.284 1.336 
1999 1.272 1.268 1.333 
2000 1.263 1.236 1.334 
2001 1.239 1.234 1.291 
2002 1.221 1.214 1.277 
2003 1.209 1.197 1.258 
2004 1.188 1.186 1.255 
2005 1.177 1.171 1.250 
Overall reduction -10.3% -20.9% -24.6% 
Table 4: Input-specific technical overuse coefficients 
Note: The yearly average values are calculated as (Uit +TE×xit)/TE×xit  (where Uit is the input-specific 
technical inefficiency term, derived from eq. (4)) 
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The γ parameters are close to 1 and always statistically significant at 1%.29 This 
indicates that the variability of the one-sided inefficiency term (u) dominates the variability 
due to noise (v). In other words, once exogenous operational characteristics have been 
purged and all firms are considered as operating in a common virtual context without 
regulatory and time effects, they still manage their inputs differently. This difference 
reflects their intrinsic inefficiency. 
The η parameters are in all cases positive and statistically significant at 1%. This 
means that the trend of the input-specific technical inefficiency is negative, which implies 
that managers’ ability to reduce overuse of inputs improved over time. 
The percentages of overuse with respect to the technically optimal best practice are 
presented, input-by-input, in Table 4. 
The greatest reduction concerns CAPEX (-24.6%), which starts from the most 
inefficient position (49.6% inefficiency in financial year 1992-93), whereas the lowest one 
belongs to EMPL factor (-10.3%) which starts from a lesser 28.0% coefficient of over-use. 
The estimates relative to the allocative distortions are presented in Table 5. Here, the 
regulatory dummies do not play a significant role, even though they have the expected 
sign. This lack of significance could be explained by arguing that the convergence to the 
cost-minimizing input mix was a gradual process driven by managers’ changing perception 
of the new economic context. The η parameters are positive and highly significant, 
indicating that this convergence could be attributed to managers’ increasing skill in 
organizing resources. This process focused particularly on labor, as is shown by the 
magnitude of the corresponding η parameter (0.373). 
The TIME variable is negative but not significant. It is interesting to note that TIME 
works in opposite direction for technical and allocative input-specific inefficiency 
measures. This result seems to shed some light on the role of the technical progress/regress 
which has an ambiguous impact in the literature (see Ashton 2000b and Saal and Parker, 
2001). 
 
 EMPL OTHEX CAPEX 
 Parameter t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio  
REG94 -2.469 (1.390)  -1.244 (-0.297)  5.001 (0.770)  
REG99 -2.023 (-1.102)  -2.419 (-0.530)  -1.314 (-0.190)  
TIME -0.078 (-0.235)  -0.204 (-0.242)  -1.647 (-1.230)  
γ 0.006 (1.269) *** 0.353 (2.019) *** 0.518 (3.121) ***
η 0.373 (13.487) *** 0.071 (2.295) ** 0.094 (4.054) ***
Likelihood -400.642   -513.308   -571.629   
Table 5: Regulatory impact on input-specific allocative distortion 
Note: Estimates marked with (***) are statistically significant at 1% level; estimates marked with (**) are 
significant at 5% level 
Input-by-input measures of allocative managerial inefficiency have been derived by 
computing the coefficients of distortion depicted in Table 6. As we used the absolute value 
                                                 
29 The one-sided generalised likelihood-ratio test of H0: γ=0 always exceeds the 1% critical value of 5.412. 
Hence, the traditional average response function is not a correct representation of the data (Coelli et al, 
2005). 
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of the overall input slacks into the equations (5), these allocative inefficiency measures 
should be interpreted as deviations from cost-minimizing input levels, without distinction 
upon the direction of the distortion.30 
As already noted, the labor factor shows a powerful convergence (-71.3%). Starting 
from a position of over-utilization, the reorganization process led de facto the factor to its 
allocatively optimal level. The correction for OTHEX has been equal to -4.4%, while a 
percentage of -16.0% is observed for CAPEX, which started from a position of sub-optimal 
utilization. These findings also suggest that the reorganization process could have taken 
the form of capital for labor substitution, consistently with the findings by Saal and Parker 
(2001). 
 
  EMPL OTHEX CAPEX 
1993 1.721 1.079 1.247 
1994 1.480 1.071 1.218 
1995 1.343 1.069 1.204 
1996 1.230 1.064 1.182 
1997 1.159 1.059 1.163 
1998 1.111 1.056 1.149 
1999 1.076 1.052 1.135 
2000 1.052 1.049 1.123 
2001 1.036 1.045 1.111 
2002 1.024 1.044 1.112 
2003 1.016 1.041 1.100 
2004 1.011 1.038 1.097 
2005 1.008 1.035 1.087 
Overall reduction -71.3% -4.4% -16.0% 
Table 6: Input-specific allocative convergence coefficients 
Note: The yearly average values are calculated as (Uit+xit*)/xit* (where Uit is the input-specific allocative 
distortion term, derived from eq. (5)) 
8 Conclusions and policy remarks 
In this study, we extend the previous analysis on the regulatory policy impact in the 
context of the England and Wales water and sewerage industry to cover a longer period. 
As far as the 1994 price review is concerned, the previous empirical evidence did not 
provide strong support of a positive effect of regulatory interventions on cost efficiency. 
However, the 1999 price control showed a change in the regulatory policy, which for the 
first time imposed a real price reduction, which may be expected to lead to a change in 
firm’s behavior. 
                                                 
30 It is worth noting that EMPL and CAPEX are characterised respectively, by over and under-utilisation for 
most of the observations. Only OTHEX shows alternating positive and negative signs in the measure of 
allocative distortion. 
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We analyze the impact of regulation on both technical and allocative efficiency 
components, using a DEA-based two-stage method, derived from Fried et al (2002), which 
allows taking into account environmental effects, as well as noise. This permitted us to 
circumvent the major drawbacks inherent DEA methodology and to build up input-specific 
efficiency measures. 
The results can be summarized as follows: 
• the 1994 price review period maintained the previous record of limited 
productivity improvement, whereas the 1999 review period showed significant 
improvements as far as technical efficiency is concerned; 
• the overall allocative efficiency measure, as well as the input-specific allocative 
distortions improved continuously during the observed period. The firms at first 
exhibited over-utilization of labor and under-utilization of capital but these 
distortions reduce gradually over time; 
• the trend of pure managerial efficiency shows evidence of a significant 
improvement in managerial capabilities during the observed period, both in 
technical and allocative terms. 
In light of these results and noting that our dataset does not allow any direct judgment 
about privatization, some conclusions can be drawn. The regulatory environment set after 
privatization seems to have improved allocative efficiency through the elimination of the 
initial input distortions. Thus, previous evidence of labour-saving capital-augmenting 
technological change is confirmed. The introduction of indirect competition through a 
yardstick competition system may have induced the firms to be more efficient in choosing 
cost-minimizing inputs combination. Furthermore, the results seem consistent with those 
theories that predict an overuse of labor by the publicly-owned firms, whether through a 
managerial preference for over-employment or difficulties over access to capital markets. 
The removal of these constraints could have induced this input substitution. 
What explains the time patterns of improvements in technical efficiency? More 
particularly, do the results suggest – in a broader regulatory perspective – that tougher 
targets elicit greater efforts to eliminate inefficiency? We noted at the outset that, absent 
problems associated with the ratchet effect, investors derive broadly the same benefits 
from cost reduction within a price control period however demanding or lax is the implicit 
productivity target embodied in the cap. Firms may, however, respond differently to tough 
targets for a number of reasons, including the following: tough targets may more closely 
align the interests of managers with those of shareholders and prevent managers from 
enjoying a relatively quiet life; secondly, suppliers of debt finance may spring into action 
if their returns were threatened. Our sample does not enable us to discriminate among these 
or other explanations but our results raise questions for regulators and others over how 
price caps work in practice. We will return to some of them in a later paper which will also 
examine the much laxer 2004 price control review. 
Finally, what it seems of great interest for regulators is that once operational 
environment and economic (regulatory) effects have been eliminated, pure managerial 
efficiency could be elicited, giving a more precise assessment of the change of managers’ 
incentives over time. In terms of both technical and allocative efficiency, there is evidence 
of improving managerial performance. This may be seen as consequence of the change in 
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ownership, as well as of the system of performance assessment set up by the regulator after 
privatization. 
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